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Although multiple neuroimaging studies suggest that affect labeling (i.e., putting feelings into words) can
dampen affect-related responses in the amygdala, the consequences of affect labeling have not been
examined in other channels of emotional responding. We conducted four studies examining the effect of
affect labeling on self-reported emotional experience. In study one, self-reported distress was lower
during affect labeling, compared to passive watching, of negative emotional pictures. Studies two and
three added reappraisal and distraction conditions, respectively. Affect labeling showed similar effects on
self-reported distress as both of these intentional emotion regulation strategies. In each of the first three
studies, however, participant predictions about the effects of affect labeling suggest that unlike reap-
praisal and distraction, people do not believe affect labeling to be an effective emotion regulation
strategy. Even after having the experience of affect labels leading to lower distress, participants still
predicted that affect labeling would increase distress in the future. Thus, affect labeling is best described
as an incidental emotion regulation process. Finally, study four employed positive emotional pictures and
here, affect labeling was associated with diminished self-reported pleasure, relative to passive watching.
This suggests that affect labeling tends to dampen affective responses in general, rather than specifically
alleviating negative affect.
Keywords: emotion, emotion regulation, emotional experience
Putting feelings into words can be an effective way to manage
unwanted emotions and the distress associated with aversive
events. A century of different forms of talk therapy and countless
bedside diaries attest to this notion. In the past two decades, there
has been a great deal of research demonstrating that putting feel-
ings into words leads to long term improvements in mental and
physical health (Frattaroli, 2006; Pennebaker & Beall, 1986). Most
recently, it was demonstrated that writing down one’s worries
regarding an impending exam significantly improved performance
on that exam just moments later (Ramirez & Beilock, 2011).
Nevertheless, broad consensus is still lacking regarding the mech-
anisms that allow putting feelings into words to be beneficial. In
the current research, we suggest that part of the benefit results from
the fact that putting feelings into words involves ‘affect labeling.’
Whereas putting feelings into words can involve a lengthy char-
acterization of one’s feelings along with attempts to find new
insights and understandings, affect labeling refers to the simple act
of using words to characterize feelings or the emotional aspects of
stimuli and events. A number of fMRI studies have examined the
neural correlates of affect labeling (Berkman & Lieberman, 2009)
and the results are consistent with an emotion regulation account
of the benefits of putting feelings into words. However, neural
responses are just one measure of emotional responses and no
study to date has examined the subjective emotional consequences
of affect labeling.
Affect Labeling
Most of what is currently known about the effects of affect
labeling comes from fMRI studies. These studies have shown that
processing the affective aspects of stimuli with words recruits
different brain regions than processing the affective aspects of
stimuli in more perceptual or experiential ways (Hariri,
Bookheimer, & Mazziotta, 2000; Lieberman et al., 2007). In these
studies, participants are typically asked to either choose from a pair
of words or from a pair of pictures, the word or picture that is
relevant to the emotional content of a target picture. For instance,
the target picture might be an angry face and participants would
choose the word “angry” on a labeling trial or choose the picture
of another angry face on a perceptual matching trial. Affect label-
ing consistently recruits right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
(VLPFC), a region involved in effortful processing (Duncan &
Owen, 2000), across a number of affect labeling studies (Lieber-
man, in press). In contrast, perceptual processing of affective
stimuli typically activates the amygdala, a region associated with
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automatic affective processes (Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1999;
Whalen et al., 1998). Despite the potentially automatic nature of
amygdala responses, affect labeling of affective stimuli is com-
monly associated with a dampened amygdala response (Foland et
al., 2008; Hariri et al., 2000; Lieberman et al., 2007). Additionally,
the magnitude of right VLPFC responses during affect labeling is
typically inversely associated with the magnitude of amygdala
responses, consistent with the idea that affect labeling serves to
regulate amygdala responses by way of right VLPFC.
One potential implication of these findings is that affect labeling
may serve to regulate emotional responses more generally, across
multiple channels of emotion processing, and thus provide at least
a partial account of the benefits of putting feelings into words.
However, to date, affect labeling paradigms have almost exclu-
sively examined the effects of affect labeling on neural responses
(cf. Tabibnia, Lieberman, & Craske, 2008).
The other main line of investigation has focused on the rela-
tionship of affect labeling to emotion regulation in preschool aged
children. Language impairments in young children are associated
with poorer emotion regulation (Fujiki, Brinton, & Clarke, 2002)
and affect labeling ability is associated with greater self-control
(Izard et al., 2001) and less time appearing angry or hurt (Denham,
1986). The common refrain of “use your words” partially captures
this notion that early affect labeling is an important contributor to
emotion regulation. Denham writes, “Without the label, no dis-
tancing occurs between feeling and action” (p. 230, 1996). Al-
though important and interesting, these studies are limited by the
use of observation and are correlational in nature. Experimental
examination of how other channels of emotion experience are
influenced by affect labeling is critical to determining whether
affect labeling constitutes a form of emotion regulation.
The Current Research
The current research had a number of goals. First and foremost,
we wanted to examine whether the effects of affect labeling on
amygdala activity generalized to another channel of emotional
responding: self-reported emotional experience. In each study, we
examined self-reported emotional responses to emotionally evoc-
ative images from the International Affective Picture Set (IAPS;
Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999).
A second goal of the current investigation was to examine the
relation of affect labeling to other emotion regulation techniques.
It is unclear whether affect labeling relies on similar mechanisms
as established emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal or
distraction. Thus, in studies 2 and 4, we compared the effects of
affect labeling and reappraisal and, in Study 3, we compared the
effects of affect labeling and distraction.
A third goal was to examine people’s theories or expectations
about the effectiveness of different emotion regulation strategies.
Thus, in each study, some participants were asked to predict their
emotional experiences (Gilbert et al., 1998) under different poten-
tial conditions (e.g., watching, labeling, reappraising). In studies 1
and 2, groups of participants who had not experienced the task
previously made predictions, whereas in studies 2–4, participants
made predictions after going through the experience of the basic
task. Our basic hypothesis was that people would be less aware of
the benefits of affect labeling than they are of other emotion
regulation strategies. More specifically, we predicted that affect
labeling would reduce distress, but that predictors would instead
predict that affect labeling increases distress. If this is the case,
then affect labeling could be characterized as a form of incidental
emotion regulation, which would indicate that people are unaware
of its benefits. If predictors who have just gone through the
experience of labeling aversive images also make this mispredic-
tion, it would suggest existing lay theories about affect labeling
may be resistant, even in the face of recent contrary evidence.
A fourth and final goal was to determine whether affect labeling
is only effective when labeling negative emotional stimuli or if the
effects extend to dampening positive emotional responses to pos-
itive stimuli as well. Prior neuroimaging studies of affect labeling
have exclusively focused on negative emotional stimuli, so it is
unclear what to expect.
Study 1: Affect Labeling and Self-Reported Distress
Method
Overview. In Study 1, we examined the effects of affect
labeling on self-reported distress. Although prior affect labeling
studies have used emotionally expressive faces as target images,
these are unlikely to produce meaningful levels of subjective
distress in observers. Thus, pictures from the International Affec-
tive Picture System (IAPS, Lang et al., 1999) were used to induce
stronger emotional responses. The images rated most emotionally
arousing and negative were used, as they are quite aversive for
many people to look at. In Study 1, one group of participants
(“experiencers”) labeled or attended to extremely negative, mod-
erately negative, and neutral images. After each image, these
participants were asked how distressing it had been to look at the
image. A second group of participants (“predictors”) read descrip-
tions of trials similar to those in the experiencer protocol and
predicted how distressing it would be to look at those pictures
while either labeling or attending. These predictions allow us to
assess participants’ theories or expectations about the effect of
affect labeling on one’s emotional state.
Participants. Participants were 44 right-handed undergradu-
ates (17 males, mean age  24.1, SD  1.9) at the University of
California, Los Angeles who participated for class credit. Partici-
pants were screened for phobia to the sight of blood. Any individ-
uals reporting this phobia were excused from participation in the
rest of the study. Informed consent was obtained per the guidelines
of the Human Subjects Protection Committee.
Stimuli. Images were selected and categorized based on
average arousal and valence ratings from the original IAPS data-
base (Lang et al., 1999). Valence ratings were based on a 9-point
likert scale, with 1 indicating negative valence and 9 indicating
positive valence. Arousal ratings were also based on a 9-point
likert scale with 1 indicating low arousal and 9 indicating high
arousal. Negative images were broken down into two categories.
Extremely negative stimuli included pictures of mutilation and
other severe injuries (mean arousal 7.21, mean valence 1.41),
whereas moderately negative pictures were typically of unpleasant
events or emotions such as a woman crying or a robbery (mean
arousal  5.5, mean valence  2.48). Neutrally valenced images
were of people with neutral expressions or people in everyday
settings (mean arousal  2.98, mean valence  5.62). Four neg-
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ative and one neutral image appeared in each block with no
pictures repeating over the course of the experiment.
Procedure. Participants in the “experiencer” condition (N 
28) performed a computer task that involved affect labeling and
watching emotionally evocative pictures. Participants first viewed
neutral and unpleasant pictures from the IAPS (Lang et al., 1999)
one at a time presented in blocks of five trials. The order of the
blocks was counterbalanced across two versions such that half of
the participants saw one order and the other half saw a different
order. Each block contained one neutral, two moderately negative,
and two extremely negative picture trials based on arousal and
valence ratings of the original IAPS. Prior to each block, a three
second instruction indicated whether the participant should label or
watch the pictures in that block. The instruction cues “scene
description” or “look and let yourself respond naturally” indicated
labeling and watching blocks, respectively. Pictures that appeared
in the labeling block in one run order appeared in the watch block
in the second run order and vice versa. Pictures with similar
content (e.g., people grieving) were shown in each condition.
During the watch trials, a picture was presented for 5 s and the
participant was asked to attend to the picture without making an
overt response. During the label trials, participants were asked to
choose from a pair of words that appeared below the IAPS picture,
the word that was semantically relevant to the picture. Both of the
words were negatively valenced if the picture was negatively
valenced or neutrally valenced if the picture was neutrally va-
lenced. Thus, for instance, a picture of a person crying could have
appeared with the words “crying” and “bomb” below the picture.
Participants chose a word by pressing a key corresponding to the
word’s position on the screen during the 5 s that the picture and
words were on the screen (see Figure 1).
After each picture presentation, regardless of condition, partic-
ipants indicated the affective experience they had had during the
presentation of the picture. Participants saw the question “How
distressed did you feel while looking at the picture?” and then
answered on a 9-point likert scale with “not distressed” and “very
distressed” as anchors. This question appeared for 4.5 s, during
which the participant answered. The experimenter stressed that
there was no right or wrong answer and that it was best to go with
the first, intuitive response. A three second rest occurred between
the distress question and the beginning of the next trial.
Participants in the “predictor” condition (N  16) were not
presented with IAPS images, but instead were asked to imagine
they were going through trials like those in the procedure de-
scribed above. Each participant read a description of two trials
from each of the six trial types (labeling or watching each of the
neutral, moderately negative, and extremely negative picture
types) and was asked how distressing they thought it would be to
look at this stimulus for 5 s. For instance, participants were asked
to imagine observing “a picture of a mutilated face”, which would
constitute imagining what an extremely aversive trial in the watch
condition would be like. Similarly, participants were asked to
imagine selecting a label for “a picture of women grieving, with
the words pollute and sorrow”, which would constitute imagining
what a moderately aversive trial from the label condition would be
like. After each description, participants indicated how they
thought they would have felt, on a 9-point likert scale anchored by
“not distressed” and “very distressed” and like the experiencers
had 4.5 s to answer.
Participants were randomized to either the experiencer or pre-
diction conditions. However, we oversampled in the experiencer,
relative to the predictor, condition approximately two to one. Our
expectation was that actual affect labeling effects would tend to be
relatively small in comparison to the prediction of affect labeling
effects and thus we wanted to increase our statistical power to
detect effects in the experiencer condition.
Results and Discussion
As predicted, experiencers reported that negatively valenced
images (collapsed across moderately and extremely negative im-
ages) were more distressing to look at in the watch (6.64) relative
to the label (6.25) conditions, t(27) 2.96, p .01 (see Figure 2).
This effect was present for moderately negative images that were
watched (5.40) or labeled (4.97), t(27)  3.48, p  .01, but
showed only a trend toward significance for extremely negative
images that were watched (7.60) or labeled (7.52), t(27)  1.63,
p  .15.
In contrast to the experiencers, predictors expected labeling to
lead to greater distress (6.94) than watching (5.72) negative im-
ages, t(16) 4.10, p .001 (see Figure 2). This effect was present
for moderately negative images that would be watched (3.75) or
labeled (6.10), t(16)  4.51, p  .001, but not for extremely
negative images that would be watched (7.68) and labeled (7.78),
t(16)  0.75, p  .20.
Overall, there was a significant group by condition interaction
(see Figure 2), F(1, 43)  29.38, p  .001, such that predictors
underpredicted the distress of watching negative images, t(44) 
2.64, p  .05, but overpredicted the distress that would occur
while labeling, t(44) 2.05, p .05. Put another way, participants
underpredicted the benefits of labeling relative to watching (pre-
dicted benefit: 1.22; actual benefit: .39). This interaction was
still significant when limited to moderately negative images, F(1,
43) 39.69, p .001, but not when limited to extremely negative
images, F(1, 43)  0.81, p  .20.
It should be noted that the comparisons across predictors and
experiencers are limited by the fact that experiencers saw many
more images for each condition than predictors imagined seeing.
Nevertheless, the overall pattern depends only on the within group
comparisons demonstrating that experiencers and predictors be-
lieved that affect labeling related to watching in qualitatively
different ways.
In summary, three main findings emerged from this study. First,
choosing a label that describes a negative aspect of an aversive
image diminishes the self-reported distress associated with lookingFigure 1. Sample trials from Affect Label and Watch conditions.
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at the image. This is consistent with the previous neuroimaging
work in which labeling was associated with diminished amygdala
activity (Foland et al., 2008; Hariri et al., 2000; Lieberman et al.,
2007). Second, in this study, labeling may be primarily beneficial
in diminishing distress for moderately aversive stimuli. Third,
participants’ predictions of the distress of watching and labeling
aversive images was the reverse of the actual experience. Partici-
pants expected that selecting a label that could highlight the
aversive aspect of the image would be more distressing than
merely watching the image; however, for experiencers the opposite
was true. This suggests that the self-reported distress of the expe-
riencers is unlikely to be due to any demand characteristics as they
would drive self-reported responses in the opposite direction.
Study 2: Affect Labeling and Reappraisal
Method
Overview. Study 2 was similar to Study 1 except for two
additions. First, there was an added reappraisal condition in which
participants actively tried to diminish their emotional responses to
the target images by generating new, less distressing ways of
thinking about the content of the images. Adding this condition
allows for a comparison of affect labeling and reappraisal in three
ways: (a) what are the relative magnitudes of their effects? (b) are
the effects of each, relative to attending to the images, correlated
with one another? and (c) are individuals able to predict the effects
of affect labeling and reappraisal with similar success?
The second change to this design involved adding another group
of predictors. These predictors (predictors2) were experiencers first
and then made predictions after finishing the experiencer protocol.
We were interested in predictors2 because their responses repre-
sent a test of how ingrained people’s theories of affect labeling are.
One might expect that after just having reported, trial by trial, that
affect labeling reduces distress, these participants might be much
more accurate than predictors1 who never had the experience. Yet
if the prior experience does not improve the predictions, this would
suggest that people’s theories about affect labeling might be rel-
atively immune to contradictory experience.
Participants. Forty-six right-handed undergraduates (20
males, mean age  20.3, SD  1.69) at the University of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles participated for class credit. Participants were
screened for phobia to the sight of blood. Any individuals report-
ing this phobia were excused from participation in the rest of the
study. Informed consent was obtained per the guidelines of the
Human Subjects Protection Committee.
Procedure. “Experiencers” in Study 2 (N  31) viewed
neutral and unpleasant pictures in blocks of five trials as described
in Study 1. Prior to each block, a three second instruction indicated
whether the participant should label, watch, or reappraise. The
instruction cues “scene description,” “look and let yourself re-
spond naturally,” or “decrease emotion” indicated labeling, watch-
ing, and reappraisal blocks, respectively.
Label and watch trials were identical to those in Study 1. For the
reappraisal trials, a picture was presented for 5 s during which time
the participant was asked to actively think about the image in a
way that made their emotional response decrease (Ochsner &
Gross, 2005). If the image of a man lying in a hospital bed was
presented, participants may have reappraised the picture in a more
positive light by imagining that the person was possessed of a
strong constitution and would likely recover quickly. Possible
ways of reappraising were discussed with each participant. Partic-
ipants practiced reappraising and were given feedback about their
reappraisal strategies prior to the actual task.
After each picture presentation participants indicated their af-
fective experience by answering the question “How distressed did
you feel while looking at the picture?” on a 9-point likert scale
with “not distressed” and “very distressed” as anchors. A 3 s rest
occurred between the distress question and the beginning of the
next trial.
The second set of participants (predictors1) (N 15), was asked
to imagine they were going through trials from the computer task
described above. Participants read a description of two trials from
each of the nine conditions and were asked how distressing they
thought it would be to look at this stimulus for 5 s. Participants
were asked to imagine observing, labeling, and decreasing their
emotional response to different pictures. After each description,
participants indicated how they think they would have felt, on a
9-point likert scale anchored by not distressed and very distressed,
if they had actually seen each picture.
Finally, a third set of participants (predictors2) (N  23) were a
subset of the experiencers who completed the prediction task after
completing the experiencer protocol. These postexperience predic-
tors went through the exact protocol as the predictors1, but did so
only after completing the experiencer protocol. It is important to
note that the experiencer protocol was never referred to once these
participants were going through the predictor protocol; experi-
menters treated them as fully independent procedures. In addition,
although the descriptions of pictures given in the predictor proto-
col generically described the kind of images in the experiencer
protocol, no particular images from the experiencer protocol were
referenced, nor were participants advised to reflect back on their
experiences with the images seen the prior protocol. Finally, the
Figure 2. Level of predicted and experienced distress while viewing
negative emotional pictures under Affect Label and Watch conditions.
Note: Although generally assumed that overlapping error bars indicate
nonsignificant differences, this is only true for between subject analyses.
For within subject analyses, the ‘error-bar’ heuristic would only apply if
the standard error of the difference scores were used in the bar graphs.
Given that our bar graphs include both between and within subject com-
parisons, it is important to distinguish to which comparisons the error-bar
heuristic applies.
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cognitive instructions given during the prediction protocol for a
given image description (reappraise/label/watch) were not
matched to the cognitive instructions associated with the same
image during the experiencer protocol. Thus, if asked to imagine
reappraising a picture of a grieving woman, participants would not
be able to think back to having reappraised a picture of a grieving
woman during the experiencer protocol. Participants may have
been able to draw on their recent experience with reappraising,
labeling, and watching in general to imagine how they might be
affected by doing so in an imagined future context, but they could
not simply retrieve an instance of, for example, reappraising a
specific image to answer how that same image would be reap-
praised in the future.
Results and Discussion
Among the experiencers, the results for labeling and watching
largely replicated Study 1. Once again, experiencers reported that
negatively valenced images (collapsed across moderately and ex-
tremely negative images) were more distressing to look at in the
watch (6.03) relative to the label (5.81) conditions, t(28)  2.12,
p  .05 (see Figure 3). This effect was present for extremely
negative images that were watched (7.37) or labeled (7.08),
t(28)  3.48, p  .01, but not for moderately negative images that
were watched (4.70) or labeled (4.54), t(28)  1.44, p  .16.
The reappraisal condition led to less self-reported distress (5.24)
than watching, t(28)  4.45, p  .001, and than labeling, t(28) 
3.51, p  .01. Reappraisal led to less self-reported distress than
watching in both the moderately negative image trials (3.95),
t(28)  4.33, p  .001, and in the extremely negative image trials
(6.54), t(28)  3.51, p  .01. Similarly, reappraisal led to less
self-reported distress than labeling in both the moderately negative
image trials, t(28)  3.34, p  .01, and in the extremely negative
image trials, t(28)  2.88, p  .01.
Interestingly, the benefit participants received from labeling,
relative to watching, was significantly correlated with the benefit
they received with reappraising, relative to labeling, r  .43, p 
.05 (see Figure 4). This correlation was strong for the extremely
negative image trials, r  .58, p  .01, and also significant in the
moderately negative image trials, r  .34, p  .05. This result
suggests that the same people who benefit the most from reap-
praising also tend to benefit the most from labeling and is consis-
tent with the notion that reappraisal and affect labeling share some
common underlying mechanisms for emotion regulation. This is
consistent with other work demonstrating correlated levels of
amygdala reductions in reappraisal and affect labeling, as well as
similar functional connectivity observed across the two tasks
(Payer, Baicy, Lieberman, & London, under review).
Among all of the predictors, collapsing across those who only
made predictions (predictors1) and those who were experiencers first
and then made predictions (predictors2), the results for the watch and
label conditions largely replicated Study 1. Once again, predictors
expected labeling to lead to greater distress (6.76) than watching
(5.61) negative images, t(37)  5.76, p  .001 (see Figure 3). This
effect was present for moderately negative images that would be
watched (4.22) or labeled (6.24), t(37)  7.22, p  .001, but not for
extremely negative images that would be watched (7.12) and labeled
(7.28), t(37) 1.35, p .18. Critically, the predictors2 group showed
the same pattern of results for watched (5.64) and labeled (6.36)
negative images, t(22)  2.57, p  .05, as the predictors1 group did
for watched (5.55) and labeled (7.37) negative images, t(14)  8.24,
p  .05, suggesting that recent relevant experience to the contrary
does not mitigate this misprediction.
In contrast to labeling effects, reappraisal (4.84) was predicted
to produce significantly less distress than watching, t(37)  3.90,
p  .001. This was the case for both reappraisal of moderately
negative images (3.79), t(37)  2.24, p  .05, and for reappraisal
of extremely negative images (5.88), t(37)  4.65, p  .001. The
reappraisal predictions of their response to aversive images were
nearly identical for the two groups of predictors (predictors1 
4.82; predictors2  4.85) with no significant differences for reap-
praisal in general or broken down by image intensity (p’s  .40).
As in Study 1, there was a significant group by condition interac-
tion, F(2, 64) 14.39, p .001. Here, participants overpredicted the
distress during labeling, but underpredicted the distress of watching
and reappraising. Put another way, participants underpredicted the
benefits of labeling relative to watching (predicted benefit: 1.15;
actual benefit: .22; t(65)  5.24, p  .001) and accurately predicted
the benefits of reappraisal relative to watching (predicted benefit: .77;
actual benefit: .79; t(65)  .06, p  .20).
Thus, the results of Study 2 largely replicated Study 1, such that
affect labeling led to less distress than attending to negatively
valenced pictures; however, predictors predicted the opposite pat-
tern suggesting that affect labeling produces emotion regulatory
effects incidentally (i.e., without subjective awareness). This mis-
prediction was present regardless of whether the predictors had
been experiencers first or not. This is somewhat remarkable. These
predictors2 had just finished indicating, as experiencers, that they
were less distressed while labeling than while attending. Never-
theless, predictors2 still predicted that going forward, labeling
would be more distressing. This suggests a strongly held expecta-
tion about the effects of labeling as enhancing the aversiveness of
an experience, rather than reducing it, as it did in reality.
In addition, we observed that reappraisal produced a greater reduc-
tion in distress than affect labeling. However, this should be under-
stood in context. Given that the instructions to reappraise represent a
demand characteristic to report diminished distress, reappraisal effects
Figure 3. Level of predicted and experienced distress while viewing
negative emotional pictures under Affect Label, Reappraisal, and Watch
conditions.
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presumably represent a combination of true effects and demand.
Neuroimaging studies (Ochsner & Gross, 2005) have clearly demon-
strated that limbic responses are diminished during reappraisal and
thus reappraisal effects cannot be reduced to demand, but it is still
likely that some component of the self-reports during reappraisal
reflect demand. It is plausible that participants’ predictions about the
magnitude of reappraisal effects are some indication of their theories
and expectations about what reappraisal should do and thus may index
the strength of the demand characteristics to some degree. In other
words, someone who predicts that reappraisal will not affect their
emotional state is less likely to respond on the basis of demand
characteristics than someone who predicts that reappraisal will dra-
matically affect their emotional state. Taking this into account, it
appears that reappraisal may induce greater demand effects than
labeling and thus it is unclear how much greater the true effect of
reappraisal on emotional state is, compared to labeling. In the future,
it would be of interest to collect forecasts prior to fMRI scans of
reappraisal to determine whether those who forecast the largest ben-
efits of reappraisal are presenting an accurate assessment of their own
ability to diminish limbic responses or simply show the greatest
effects of demand characteristics.
Study 3: Affect Labeling and Distraction
Method
Overview. Study 3 was identical to Study 2 with one excep-
tion. Here, a distraction condition was included instead of a reap-
praisal condition.
Participants. Twenty-five right-handed undergraduates (11
males, mean age  19.4, SD  1.47) at the University of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles participated for class credit. Participants re-
porting a phobia to the sight of blood were screened out. The
Human Subjects Protection Committee approved all procedures.
Procedure. As in the previous studies there were both expe-
riencers (N  25) and predictors (N  21). All of the predictors in
this study went through the experiencer protocol first and thus the
predictors were a subset of the experiencers. As in Study 2, no
mention of the prior experiencer protocol was made during the
prediction protocol.
Study 3 followed the design of Study 2 with a distraction
condition added in place of the reappraisal condition. The instruc-
tion cues “scene description,” “look and let yourself respond
naturally,” or “distraction” indicated labeling, watching, or dis-
traction blocks, respectively.
Instructions for watch and label trials were the same as in
studies 1 and 2. During distraction trials, participants continued to
visually attend to the images for 5 s each, but were instructed to
think about something other than the picture. Any topic unrelated
to the picture was acceptable. For instance, participants could
distract themselves from a picture of a corpse by thinking about
laundry or their next social outing. All other aspects of the proce-
dure were the same as those described in studies 2 and 3.
Results and Discussion
As in studies 1 and 2, experiencers reported that negatively
valenced images (collapsed across moderately and extremely neg-
ative images) were more distressing to look at in the watch (5.73)
relative to the label (5.49) conditions, t(24)  2.44, p  .05 (see
Figure 5). This effect was present for extremely negative images
that were watched (7.26) or labeled (6.93), t(24)  2.75, p  .01,
Figure 4. Correlation between effects during Affect Label and Reappraisal conditions.
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but not for moderately negative images that were watched (4.21) or
labeled (4.06), t(24)  1.25, p  .20.
The distraction condition also led to less self-reported distress
(5.45) than watching, t(24)  2.50, p  .05, but produced nearly
identical levels as labeling (5.45 vs. 5.49), t(24)  0.90, p  .20.
Distraction produced marginally lower levels of distress than
watching for both moderately negative images (3.92), t(24) 
1.72, p  .10, and for extremely negative images (6.98), t(24) 
1.96, p  .10. Distraction did not produce different distress levels
than labeling for either moderately or extremely negative images.
Unlike in Study 2, where labeling and reappraisal effects were
significantly correlated with one another, only a trend toward
significance emerged in the correlation of labeling and distraction
effects, r  .32, p  .15 (collapsed across moderate and extreme
images). There was also a trend for extremely negative images,
r .32, p .15; however, there was a robust relationship between
labeling and distraction effects for the moderately negative images,
r  .62, p  .01.
As in studies 1 and 2, predictors expected that negatively va-
lenced images would be more distressing to look at in the label
(5.99) than watch (4.98) conditions, t(20)  3.86, p  .001 (see
Figure 5). This effect was present for moderately negative images
that were watched (3.48) or labeled (5.29), t(20) 4.53, p .001,
but not for extremely negative images that were watched (6.48) or
labeled (6.68) where the effect was numerically reversed, t(37) 
1.22, p  .20.
In contrast to labeling, distraction (4.32) was predicted to pro-
duce significantly less distress than watching, t(20)  3.21, p 
.01. This effect was significant for extremely negative images
(5.62), t(20)  2.88, p  .01, and marginally significant for
moderately negative images (3.02), t(20)  1.75, p  .10.
Similar to Study 2, there was a significant group by condition
interaction, F(2, 43)  17.39, p  .001, such that participants
overpredicted the distress of labeling, but underpredicted the dis-
tress of watching and distraction. Participants underpredicted the
benefits of labeling relative to watching (predicted benefit: 1.01;
actual benefit: .24; t(43)  4.57, p  .001) and marginally over-
predicted the benefits of distraction relative to watching (predicted
benefit: .65; actual benefit: .28; t(43)  1.83, p  .10).
Once again, Study 3 replicated the basic pattern of label/watch
effects seen in studies 1 and 2 such that watching negative images
was more distressing than labeling them, whereas participants
predicted that labeling would be more distressing than watching. In
addition, we observed that distraction produced a benefit of similar
magnitude as affect labeling and that the benefits of these two
manipulations may be correlated, particularly for moderately aver-
sive images. In contrast to affect labeling which was associated
with less distress than predicted, distraction, like reappraisal, was
associated with more distress than predicted. Finally, predictors in
Study 3 had all already gone through the experiencer protocol
before making their predictions. Thus, even though these predic-
tors actually felt less distress when labeling than watching in the
first part of the study, when later asked what it would be like to go
through the same task again, they indicated that labeling would be
more distressing than watching. This again suggests that the ben-
efits of labeling may be outside of awareness and resistant to
relevant contrary experiences.
Study 4: Labeling and Reappraising Positive Images
Method
Overview. Study 4 is quite similar to Study 2 except for a
focus on positive rather than negative images. All previous affect
labeling studies have focused on the effects of affect labeling on
distressing stimuli. Here, we examined the effects of affect label-
ing on stimuli that typically induce positive affect. Because dif-
ferent classes of IAPS images are known to produce positive affect
in men and women, we collected a female-only sample, with
images selected based on female IAPS ratings. More specifically,
we wanted to include images rated high in positive valence and in
arousal, to parallel the extremely aversive negative images used in
studies 1–3. Among the images that meet both criteria for valence
and arousal, there is almost no overlap in pictures rated by men and
women. This is largely due to the fact that for men, virtually all
images meeting critieria were erotic images of women or couples.
Participants. Twenty-two right-handed female undergradu-
ates (mean age  20, SD  1.69) at the University of California,
Los Angeles participated for class credit. Only females were run to
control for gender effects. Informed consent was obtained per the
guidelines of the Human Subjects Protection Committee.
Stimuli. Images were selected and categorized based on
average female ratings of arousal and valence from the original
IAPS database (Lang et al., 1999). Valence ratings were based on
a 9-point likert scale, with 1 indicating negative valence and 9
indicating positive valence. Arousal ratings were also based on a
9-point likert scale with 1 indicating low arousal and 9 indicating
high arousal. Positive images were broken down into two catego-
ries. Extremely positive stimuli included pictures of attractive
men, brides, desserts, and adventurous activities such as sky diving
(mean arousal  6.05, mean valence  7.58). Moderately positive
pictures were typically of babies or friends having a good time
(mean arousal  4.63, mean valence  7.68). Neutrally valenced
images were of people with neutral expressions or neutral objects
such as a basket or lamp (mean arousal  2.37, mean valence 
4.76).
Procedure. The research team followed the same procedure
as outlined in Study 2, but with positively valenced pictures.
Figure 5. Level of predicted and experienced distress while viewing
negative emotional pictures under Affect Label, Distraction, and Watch
conditions.
474 LEIBERMAN, INAGAKI, TABIBNIA, AND CROCKETT
Participants first viewed neutral and pleasant IAPS pictures one at
a time presented in blocks of five trials. Each block contained one
neutral, two moderately positive, and two extremely positive pic-
ture trials based on the average female arousal and valence ratings
of the original IAPS. Prior to each block, a three second instruction
indicated whether the participant should label, observe, or reap-
praise their emotions to the pictures. The instruction cues “scene
description,” “look and let yourself respond naturally,” or “de-
crease emotion” appeared before each block as in Study 2. For
instance, if the image of a puppy was presented, participants may
have reappraised the picture in a more negative light by imagining
that the dog was bred to do hard labor or fight other dogs. Like in
Study 2, participants practiced reappraising prior to beginning the
experiment.
Participants saw the question “How pleasurable was it to view
this picture?” and then answered on a 9-point likert scale with not
pleasurable and very pleasurable as anchors, paralleling the dis-
tress question asked in studies 1–3. This question appeared for
4.5 s during which the participant answered. The experimenter
stressed that there was no right or wrong answer and that it was
best to go with the first, intuitive response. A three second rest
occurred between the affective question and the beginning of the
next trial. After going through the experiencer part of the protocol,
all participants also went through a predictor protocol identical to
those in previous studies except that the imagined trials were from
this protocol with positive images and participants were asked how
they thought they would feel using the question “How pleasurable
was it to view this picture?”. Note that participants were predicting
how they would answer this question based on imagining a future
trial, rather than retrieving a response to a particular trial during the
experiencer protocol.
Results and Discussion
Experiencers reported that positively valenced images (col-
lapsed across moderately and extremely positive images) were
more pleasurable to look at in the watch (6.34) relative to the label
(6.02) conditions, t(21)  2.21, p  .05, consistent with the
hypothesis that labeling diminishes affective intensity (see Figure
6). This effect was present for extremely positive images that were
watched (6.35) or labeled (5.96), t(21)  2.38, p  .01 but only at
the trend level for moderately positive images that were watched
(6.34) or labeled (6.08), t(21)  1.56, p  .15.
The reappraisal condition also led to less self-reported pleasure
(3.50) than watching, t(21)  11.55, p  .001. Reappraisal led to
less self-reported pleasure than watching in both the moderately
positive image trials (3.56), t(21)  10.70, p  .001, and in the
extremely positive image trials (3.44), t(21)  10.91, p  .001.
Similarly, reappraisal led to less self-reported pleasure than label-
ing in both the moderately positive image trials, t(21)  8.79, p 
.001, and in the extremely positive image trials, t(21)  9.40, p 
.001.
As in Study 2, which also included a reappraisal condition, the
effect for participants associated with labeling, relative to watch-
ing, was positively correlated with the effect associated with
reappraising, relative to labeling. However, the correlation in the
current study was not significant r .24, p .20. This correlation
was also not significant for the moderately positive image trials,
r  .27, p  .20, and marginally significant in the extremely
positive image trials, r  .34, p  .10.
Unlike studies 1–3 in which negative images were presented, in
the current study with positive images, predictors were remarkably
accurate in their predictions (see Figure 6). Here, predictors accu-
rately predicted that it would be more pleasurable to look at the
positive images in the watch (6.23) than the label (6.07) condi-
tions, albeit not significantly, t(21)  1.09, p  .2. The accuracy
of these predictions is reflected in the lack of interaction between
group and the watch/label conditions, F(1, 20)  1.00, p  .20.
Predictors also predicted that it would be more pleasurable to look
at the positive images in the watch than reappraise (3.13) condi-
tions, t(21)  8.98, p  .001. Again, the accuracy of these
predictions is reflected in the lack of interaction between group
and watch/reappraise conditions, F(1, 20)  1.32, p  .20.
Thus, as in previous studies with negative affective images,
affect labeling and reappraisal of positive images led to attenuated
affective responses relative to watching the images. This suggests
that affect labeling may function to diminish affective responses in
general, rather than simply alleviating distress as earlier studies
might have suggested. The primary difference between affect
labeling of positive and negative images appears to be the accuracy
of their predictions of the consequences of each. Although partic-
ipants underpredicted the benefits of labeling negative images in
studies 1–3, they were quite accurate in predicting the attenuated
positive affect in Study 4. It should be noted that the effects of
Study 4 generalize only to female samples as we did not include a
male sample in this particular study.
General Discussion
In four studies, we examined the effects of affect labeling on the
subjective emotional response to negative (Studies 1–3) and pos-
itive (Study 4) images and compared these effects to those that
result from reappraisal (Studies 2 & 4) and distraction (Study 3).
In addition, some subjects made predictions of how it would feel
to go through the task either without having seen the task (Study
Figure 6. Level of predicted and experienced pleasure while viewing
positive emotional pictures under Affect Label, Reappraisal, and Watch
conditions.
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1 & 2) or after having gone through the task themselves (Studies
2–4).
Several general findings emerged. First, in each study, affect
labeling produced an attenuation of the subjective emotional re-
sponse to the images relative to merely watching them. For neg-
ative images (Studies 1–3), affect labeling led to significantly less
distress, whereas for positive images (Study 4), affect labeling led
to less pleasure. This represents the first demonstration that affect
labeling modulates self-reported affective experience in ways con-
sistent with the limbic attenuation observed in fMRI studies. In
three of the four studies, the effects were larger for the extreme
valenced images suggesting that affect labeling may have greater
impact during stronger emotional responses.
Second, as would be expected from previous research, reap-
praisal and distraction also both reliably attenuated affective re-
sponses. Reappraisal (Study 2) and distraction (Study 3) during the
presentation of negative images led to less self-reported distress.
Similarly, reappraisal (Study 4) during the presentation of positive
images led to less self-reported pleasure.
Third, participants tended to mispredict the effects of affect
labeling on self-reported emotional experience. In studies 1–3,
participants predicted that affect labeling would lead to greater
distress than merely attending to a negative image; however, in
each study, affect labeling led to less distress than merely attend-
ing. Perhaps most striking is that in two of these studies (2 & 3),
the participants made their predictions after being experiencers. In
these cases, the same participants reported feeling less distress
during affect labeling during the first part of the study and then
went on to predict that if they had to go through similar trials in the
future, affect labeling would increase their distress. The fact that
participants predicted affect labeling would increase distress, but
during the actual trials reported decreased distress is strong evi-
dence against the possibility that affect labeling effects are due to
demand characteristics. In Study 4, participants were able to ac-
curately assess the effect of affect labeling of positive images. In
contrast to affect labeling, participants were able to reliably predict
the direction of effects that reappraisal and distraction had relative
to merely attending to images. When significant differences
emerged between prediction and experience, it was because sub-
jects believed that reappraisal (Study 2) and distraction (Study 3)
would alleviate distress more than they actually did.
Affect Labeling as Incidental Emotion Regulation
Reappraisal and distraction are well-established techniques for
emotion regulation, both in terms of self-reported experience and
their consequences for neural changes in the prefrontal cortex and
limbic system (Gross, 2008; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Although
past fMRI research suggests that affect labeling may produce a
pattern of neural responses similar to those seen during intentional
emotion regulation (Berkman & Lieberman, 2009; Burklund, Cres-
well, Irwin, & Lieberman, under review), it is still unclear whether
affect labeling should really be considered a form of emotion
regulation. Individuals do put feelings into words, during therapy,
for instance, as a means to achieve insights that will help regulate
their emotions, yet it is not obvious that people believe that the
mere act of putting feelings into words has emotion regulatory
outcomes.
Consistent with this, participants in studies 1–3 reliably indi-
cated that affect labeling would make their distress worse, not
better. Yet in each study, the subjective effects of affect labeling
paralleled the previous fMRI literature: affect labeling reliably
diminished affective responses.
If we grant that affect labeling is a form of emotion regulation,
how does it compare with the other kinds examined here? Let’s
begin with the similarities. In the current studies, affect labeling,
reappraisal, and distraction all led to diminished distress in re-
sponse to negative images and affect labeling and reappraisal also
led to diminished pleasure in response to positive images (distrac-
tion was not tested in this context). Additionally, the magnitude of
the effects of affect labeling and reappraisal, relative to watching,
were significantly correlated and the effect of affect labeling and
distraction displayed a trend toward a significant correlation. In
other words, to the extent that individuals benefited from a tradi-
tional form of emotion regulation, they also tended to benefit from
affect labeling—an effect that suggests shared mechanisms across
affect labeling and established forms of emotion regulation.
There were also important differences between the three forms
of emotion regulation as well. Whereas affect labeling and distrac-
tion produced similar reductions in affective responses, relative to
watching, reappraisal produced much greater reductions. Addition-
ally, participants’ theories of the three forms of emotion regula-
tion, in terms of predictions made about the efficacy of each, were
substantially different from one another with respect to their effi-
cacy in alleviating distress. Participants predicted that reappraisal
would have quite substantial benefits, that distraction would have
smaller but still substantial benefits, and that affect labeling would
instead increase distress levels, relative to merely watching. Put in
the context of the actual effects, participants substantially overes-
timated the affect attenuation due to reappraisal, modestly overes-
timated the affect attenuation due to distraction, and substantially
underestimated affect attenuation due to affect labeling, relative to
merely watching. The comparisons across prediction and experi-
ence are limited by the fact predictors were run through fewer
trials than experiencers. However, the qualitative patterns are still
meaningful; reappraisal and distraction were predicted to alleviate
distress and did, whereas labeling was predicted to increase dis-
tress, but did not.
Together, these differences suggest that unlike reappraisal and
distraction, which are intentionally and explicitly invoked forms of
emotion regulation, affect labeling may more properly be de-
scribed as incidental emotion regulation (Berkman & Lieberman,
2009). We use the term “incidental” rather than automatic or
implicit because affect labeling is not effort free (i.e., capacity to
label would likely be impaired by concurrent cognitive load) or
outside of awareness (i.e., people know that they are labeling), but
the prediction data strongly suggest that affect labeling is not
intentionally initiated for the purpose of emotion regulation be-
cause people do not believe that labeling is an effective emotion
regulation strategy. If one happens to be putting feelings into
words, there are emotion regulatory consequences that are inci-
dental to the intentional goal (e.g., updating a friend on what one
has been up to recently).
The similarities and differences between affect labeling and
intentional emotion regulation strategies are recapitulated in the
neural correlates associated with each. A recent review of neuro-
imaging studies of emotion regulation (Berkman & Lieberman,
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2009) reported that right VLPFC was present in 70% of intentional
emotion regulation studies and was the most commonly observed
region. Similarly, virtually every study of affect labeling has also
reported activity in right VLPFC (Berkman & Lieberman, 2009).
The difference, however, is that most intentional emotion regula-
tion studies (65%) also report left VLPFC and many also report
presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA) or posterior dorsomedial
PFC, whereas affect labeling only rarely produces activity in these
regions. In the context of the behavioral findings, this suggests that
right VLPFC may serve as a core region producing emotion
regulatory outcomes, with other regions like left VLPFC and
pre-SMA involved in initiating and maintaining an explicit emo-
tion regulation goal.
Alleviating Distress or Affect Attenuation?
Because prior work on affect labeling and expressive writing,
more generally, has almost exclusively focused on negative expe-
riences, events, and stimuli, there have been two equally plausible
accounts of what affect labeling does. On the one hand, affect
labeling might diminish the negative aspects of experience, mov-
ing one’s affect on a continuum from more negative states to more
positive states. On the other hand, affect labeling may attenuate
affect regardless of its valence such that it moves people from
either negative or positive states to more neutral states. In order to
distinguish between these accounts, it was critical to examine the
effects of affect labeling on positive affective responses as we did
in Study 4.
The results of Study 4 suggest that affect labeling serves as an
affect attenuator regardless of the initial valence of one’s affective
state, rather than an alleviator of negative affect. In Study 4, we
observed that labeling positive affective stimuli attenuated self-
reported pleasure just as in studies 1–3, labeling negative affective
stimuli attenuated self-reported distress. This is consistent with the
notion that affect labeling taps into a coarse “braking” system in
right VLPFC that is capable of inhibiting various kinds of re-
sponses (Berkman, Burklund, & Lieberman, 2009; Cohen &
Lieberman, 2010).
These results are also consistent with a growing literature dem-
onstrating that systematic analysis of the causes of one’s emotional
states tends to diminish those states. For instance, Wilson, Cen-
terbar, Kermer, and Gilbert (2005) found that people took less
pleasure in receiving a small gift from a stranger when it was easy
to analyze why the gift had been given. Wilson et al. suggest that
certainty is driving these effects with subsequent work showing
that having a sense of certainty diminishes both positive and
negative affective states (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009;
Wilson & Gilbert, 2008; see also Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, &
Larson, 1998). Similarly, Lyubormirsky, Sousa, and Dickerhoof
(2006) observed that writing or talking about positive events in
their lives diminished life satisfaction and writing or talking about
negative events in their lives increased life satisfaction, each
relative to merely thinking about the events. They argued that
writing and talking tends to be more analytic and coherent than
thinking and that it’s the analytic style of processing that produces
these effects. They tested this by inducing participants to write or
think about positive events using either an analytical or reexperi-
encing style. They found that either writing or thinking could
diminish life satisfaction if an analytical style was induced.
It should be acknowledged that whereas certainty and analytical
processing of emotional events are descriptions of the conditions
under which affect is attenuated, it is not obvious why either
should have a causal role in this attenuation. A psychological
account can be given, but an account could be generated for the
opposite findings as well. One key to these findings may be that
both analytical processing of and certainty generation for emo-
tional events invariably involves something like affect labeling. A
clear neurocognitive account can explain why psychological pro-
cesses that invoke affect labeling will lead to attenuated affect.
Specifically, affect labeling reliably activates right VLPFC and
this region in turn tends to inhibit prepotent and prereflective
responses across multiple domains including motor (Aron et al.,
2003), cognition (Depue, Curran, & Banich, 2007; Goel & Dolan,
2003; Mitchell et al., 2007), emotion (Berkman & Lieberman,
2009), pain (Lieberman et al., 2004; Wager et al., 2004), and social
cognition (Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys,
2005). Additionally, it has been demonstrated that activating right
VLPFC, even in the absence of emotion regulatory goals, can still
attenuate responses in the limbic system (Berkman, Burklund, &
Lieberman, 2009). Thus, analytical and certainty-inducing pro-
cesses that involve affect labeling should recruit right VLFPC
activity and dampen limbic responses thought to generate affective
experience.
Applications of Affect Labeling
Numerous developmental studies have demonstrated links be-
tween affect labeling and observable indices of emotion regulation
(Denham,1986; Fujiki et al., 2002; Izard et al., 2001). It has also
been established that affect labeling ability is associated with
academic competence (Izard et al., 2001) social competence
(Mostow, Izard, Fine, & Trentacosta, 2002), being more liked by
peers (Fabes, Eisenberg, Hanish, & Spinrad, 2001), and engaging
in more prosocial behavior (Denham, 1986; Izard et al., 2001).
One of these studies demonstrated that several of these effects
remain significant after controlling for general verbal ability sug-
gesting there is something specific about affect labeling ability that
contributes to other socioemotional outcomes. Mostow et al.
(2002) observed in a longitudinal study of first graders that affect
labeling ability measured in the fall predicted social skills mea-
sured in the spring, after controlling for social skills measured in
the fall. All of these studies suggest that affect labeling, perhaps by
way of better emotion regulation, promotes better social and aca-
demic behavior.
However, even by age four there are systematic differences in
affect labeling ability as a function one’s social environment.
Children high in socioeconomic status perform better at affect
labeling tasks than children low in socioeconomic status (Edwards,
Manstead, & Macdonald, 1984). Similarly, abused and maltreated
children perform worse on affect labeling tasks (Camras, Grow, &
Ribordy, 1983; for related adult fMRI findings, see Taylor, Eisen-
berger, Saxbe, Lehman, & Lieberman, 2006). Finally, one inter-
vention study that included training of affect labeling as one of its
major components, demonstrated increased social competence in
four year olds who received the training (Denham & Burton,
1996). As affect labeling was only one of the components of the
intervention and this is only a single study, more research is
needed to determine whether the training of affect labeling may
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yield a variety of salutary effects in children. Additionally, it is
important to consider the training and testing of both affect label-
ing capacity and tendency (Berkman & Lieberman, 2009). Testing
whether someone can accurately label their own emotion is quite
different from assessing whether that individual tends to sponta-
neously label the emotion when it occurs. Interventions that in-
crease this tendency may make an important contribution to child-
hood outcomes.
Issue and Limitations
Before concluding there are some remaining issues about the
experimental control, generalizability and boundary conditions of
the studies presented here. Although the studies used reappraisal
and affect labeling tasks that have been used in many prior studies,
most of the analyses involved a comparison to the typical, but
imperfect control condition that involved merely watching an
image. Reappraisal presumably involves a number of processes
including goal maintenance, working memory, language genera-
tion, and perceptual imagery generation in addition to more direct
inhibitory or regulatory processes. Affect labeling involves affec-
tive processing, linguistic processing, and categorization pro-
cesses. In both cases, the watch condition differs from the
regulation condition in many ways.
Although other studies have demonstrated that affect labeling
effects cannot be reduced to labeling per se in terms of the neural
responses (Lieberman et al., 2007), this has not yet been demon-
strated in the domain of self-report effects. Thus it is plausible that
the effects of affect labeling observed in this investigation might
be part of a broader set of labeling processes that would produce
similar effects. It is possible that other kinds of labeling that do not
focus on affect would also diminish affective responses. Whether
this is the case or not awaits further research. It should be noted
that if labeling in general produced incidental emotion regulation
effects, this would not imply that affect labeling does not produce
incidental emotion regulation effects, but would rather dilute the
specificity of this claim. It would still be the case that affect
labeling diminishes affective responses and that people’s predic-
tions about the effects of affect labeling are incorrect.
We are unaware of any research demonstrating that reappraisal
effects on self-report are specific to reappraising rather than a
broader class of psychological processes of which reappraisal is
one instance. Thus our understanding of reappraisal effects on
self-reported affect is subject to the same limitation as for affect
labeling. For instance, it is unknown whether inventing reapprais-
als for events other than the one depicted in a presented image, and
unrelated to it, would produce the same effect or not. When
presented with an image of a man sick in a hospital bed, what is the
effect of thinking about why a woman’s unrelated romantic
breakup will not be a terrible thing in the long run? Perhaps there
is some generalized effect of thinking on the bright side that is not
specific to the affect-inducing content. Given that processing an
imaginary trauma that never occurred can produced the same
health benefits that processing a real trauma can (Greenberg,
Wortman, & Stone, 1996) it is not obvious what aspect of the
reappraisal process is producing the observed effects. Thus for
both reappraisal and affect labeling further study is needed to
determine the mechanisms driving the self-reported reductions in
affective experience.
Additionally, affect labeling is meant to be a small scale ana-
logue of putting feelings into words in real world contexts that
matter (e.g., to deal with real life distress, possibly in the context
of therapy). It is an open question whether our operationalization
of affect labeling really relates to those contexts and the way affect
labeling is deployed in real life. In our study, we operationalized
affect labeling in terms of labeling the emotional content of an
image depicting an emotional scene. In daily life, the benefits of
putting feelings into words usually accrue from discussing one’s
own feelings, not just describing the emotions of others. Using our
procedure provides good experimental control because there is a
correct answer and we know we have placed it on the screen as an
option. When labeling our own feelings, the answer is likely to
vary from person to person and if we are providing written options
to participants, the person’s actual emotional state may not be one
of them. Nevertheless, there are some studies beginning to address
the issue. One recent fMRI study (Herwig, Kaffenberger, Jancke,
& Bruhl, 2010) asked people to spend time thinking about their
own emotional state and, compared to other ways of thinking about
themselves, this produced a pattern very similar to what has been
seen in past affect labeling studies (increased right VLPFC and
decreased amygdala activity). A second study (Burklund et al.,
under review) asked people to label their own feelings in response
to IAPS images (not distressed, somewhat distressed, very dis-
tressed) and found this same pattern of activity as well. Thus there
is at least some evidence that labeling emotional content and
labeling one’s own feelings produce similar responses, at least at
the level of neural responses.
The other issue here is whether the effects of labeling responses
to images that are not self-relevant provide a meaningful analogue
to the kinds of deeply personally distressing events that might lead
a person to therapy. This is a genuine limitation of this line of
work; however, there are multiple investigations with more clini-
cally relevant outcomes currently ongoing that should address this
in the near future. In one, treatment of spider phobics that incor-
porated of affect labeling (patients generating sentences of the
form “the _____ spider makes me feel _____”) resulted in the
phobics standing closer to an actual spider in a later test than a
treatment that did not involve affect labeling (Kircanski, Craske, &
Lieberman, unpublished data).
Finally, it should be noted that affect labeling should not be
thought of as always downregulating affective processes. Rumi-
nation, the process of repeatedly reviewing issues or events that are
personally distressing is known to amplify rather than diminish
distress. Although it is not yet established under what conditions
putting feelings into words dampens rather than increasing dis-
tress, the most promising reconciliation is that the level of abstrac-
tion and self-distancing in the language used is important (Kross,
Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005; Lyubormirsky et al., 2006). Labeling can
either categorize feelings and separate the feelings from oneself or
they can immerse us back into the original experience. Rumination
typically involves a great deal of imagistic language that creates a
reproduction or replaying of past events in one’s head (Lyubormir-
sky et al., 2006). Using language to create imagery is likely to
activate perceptual pathways involved in the original perception
(Kosslyn et al., 1993) and such pathways may well reactivate
limbic responses. In contrast, more abstract and detached labeling
processes may avoid perceptual reactivation and promote damp-
ening through VLPFC responses.
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Conclusions
Across four studies, we have demonstrated that labeling affec-
tive aspects of an emotionally evocative image attenuates affective
responses relative to merely attending to the same images. This
was true whether the images were positively or negatively va-
lenced. Affect labeling produced qualitatively similar effects to
reappraisal and distraction, suggesting that affect labeling has
emotion regulatory consequences. However, participants were
aware of the benefits of reappraisal and distraction, but were
unaware of the benefits of affect labeling. Thus affect labeling is
best thought of as a form of incidental emotion regulation.
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